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Abstract: This paper uses media coverage of idol-state interactions to understand the ways in
which states utilize pop culture as a component of their public diplomacy strategy. Idol-state
interactions are defined as an event where a pop cultural figure accompanies or is accompanied
by a state official to a formal meeting with a representative of a foreign government. Looking
specifically at South Korean diplomatic events where K-Pop idols are present, I find that
idol-state interactions have the potential to increase media coverage, further cultural
understanding and serve as a relationship-building tool.
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Introduction
On November 7, 2017, several news outlets reported on a viral video1 of former first lady
Melania Trump being ‘upstaged’ by K-Pop idol Choi Min-ho. The two were together at an event
hosted by the U.S. Embassy in Seoul to launch the “Girls Play 2!” initiative, a campaign to
promote girls’ participation in sports ahead of the 2018 Winter Olympic Games. However,
coverage about the event focused more on the viral video versus the mission behind the event.2
In the video, two teenage girls are talking with Melania Trump, unaware that Min-ho from idol
group SHINee is standing behind them. Suddenly, one girl realizes Min-ho is standing behind
them and taps the other girl to tell her. The second girl turns around, sees Min-ho standing
behind her and excitedly reacts by screaming, shocking the first lady. At the same time in Seoul,
United States President Donald Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in were holding a
historic summit to discuss the nuclear threat of North Korea.
While drastically different from one another, these two events signify the changing
framework public diplomacy operates within. While the Trumps’ visit to South Korea was the
first state visit to the country by a U.S. President in 25 years,3 a few months prior former U.S.
President Barack Obama had spoken at a conference in Seoul. During his speech, Obama
discussed the increased popularity of Korean pop culture as well as the impact it could have on
foreign relations.
1

Hana. 2017 November 6. “갑자기 민호가 뉴스에 나온다고 해서 급하게 여기저기 틀어보다
집캠찍어봄ㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋㅋ 방한한 멜라니아 여사와 평창올림픽 홍보관련으로 행사를 진행한것 같다~
민호보고 놀란 소녀보는 표정 개귀욤 ㅜㅜㅜㅜㅜ.” @mint_minho_1209. Twitter.
For better quality, see BBC News. 2017 Nov. 11. Melania “upstaged” by Korean Pop Star - BBC News.
YouTube.
2
Example headlines include “Video of US first lady, teens and K-pop star goes viral” from The Associated
Press, “Choi Min-ho of K-Pop Group SHINee Steals Spotlight in Viral Video of First Lady Melania Trump
& South Korean Teens” from Billboard, and “Melania Trump meets Minho of Shinee” from The Korea
Herald.
3
U.S. Embassy & Consulate in the Republic of Korea. 2017 November 8. “Joint Press Release by the
U.S.-ROK: President Donald Trump’s State Visit to the Republic of Korea.” U.S. Embassy & Consulate in
the Republic of Korea.
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“You’ve [South Korea] become an exporter of popular culture to the rest of the world,”
Obama said. “So many of our young people in America have even learned to speak some Korean
so they can keep up with the band SHINee. In exchange, I understand SHINee has developed a
passion for America’s In-N-Out Burgers.” 4
While there is much research about how exposure to foreign pop cultural products can
change individual perceptions of a nation, or how the global spread of pop culture can impact a
state’s economy and tourism industry, there has been little research on the ways governments can
harness pop culture directly into formal diplomatic relations. In this paper, I argue that the
increasing global popularity of K-Pop coupled with the use of K-Pop idols at state-sponsored
events, can provide a framework for studying how governments use pop culture in public
diplomacy. I define these events as idol-state interactions. That is, where a K-Pop idol is
accompanied by or accompanies a Korean government official to a formal event with a
representative of a foreign government. While this paper will explicitly examine the use of
K-Pop idols, the conceptualization of idol-state interactions can be applied more broadly to any
pop cultural figure including actors, influencers, celebrities, etc. Additionally, the concept of
idol-state interactions has the potential to be applied beyond the case of South Korea. By looking
exclusively at the use of K-Pop idols, I hope that future research can apply these findings to other
pop culture phenomena. Through an exploratory qualitative content analysis of idol-state
interactions, I find that these events can be used to promote cultural understanding, to increase
the audience for coverage of diplomatic events, and as a tool for building relationships.

4

Han, Sang-hyuk. 2017 July 3. “Obama ‘So long as North Korea chooses to remain outside of the world
order, they must face the consequences.’” The Chosun Ilbo.
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Previous Literature
Cultural diplomacy is a field that is deeply entangled with the notions of soft power and
public diplomacy. This section will discuss how these three fields are related with one another,
the potential for pop cultural diplomacy to provide distinction and clarity, and the benefit of
using idol-state interactions to examine how these concepts are put into practice.

Soft Power
Soft power, as defined by Nye (2004), is “the ability to get what you want through
attraction rather than coercion or payments.” This differs from hard power, which is dependent
on coercing other actors to achieve goals. Because soft power is reliant on attraction, culture is
considered to be a soft power resource due to its ability to shape preferences (Nye 1990; Nye
2004; Su 2013; Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015). But soft power is not solely based on cultural
influence. A state’s soft power ability can also be influenced by its political values and foreign
policies (Nye 1990). These other areas are important to consider and how they work alongside a
state’s culture. To be more precise, culture can be viewed as a soft power resource that can be
used strategically in the process of achieving a state’s defined goals (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015).
Nye (2008) defines culture as ‘a set of practices that create meaning for a society.’ While
the tangible and intangible manifestations of culture are diverse, scholars have typically divided
them into two categories: high culture and popular culture. High culture is often categorized as
that which appeals to the preferences of elites. A simplified example of this could be ballet, fine
art, etc. In contrast, popular culture is that which appeals to the masses. This could include stuff
like blockbuster films, video games and pop music.
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While popular culture can reflect the wants and needs of the masses (Gans 2008), states
have traditionally had a higher incentive to appeal to high culture both domestically and in their
interactions abroad. This practice is based on elite theory or the idea that elites within a society
are more likely to possess influence beyond the scope of political processes. If elites are those
that have the power to influence their government, it would then be in the interest of
governments to recognize the preferences of elites. This incentive for states to appeal to high
culture can help us understand the differences in how cultural products are given legitimacy.
Historically, high cultural products have traditionally been those that are legitimized via
official recognition by governments, nongovernmental organizations and international
organizations (Nye 2008). A simplified example of this process could be a government
establishing a museum of fine arts. Since the museum is established by the government, the art
inside the museum is then considered to be ‘high culture.’ This in turn can implicate the
perceived superiority of the art in the museum versus other types of art. In contrast, popular
cultural products have traditionally not been legitimized via state institutions, but rather through
media or market success (Nye 2008). An example of this is pop music. While historically not
recognized by governments as a ‘fine art craft,’ pop music garners its legitimacy through media
attention or in how many people purchase an album. While some would prefer to debate over the
superiority of high culture and popular culture, it is important to recognize them both as potential
cultural components of a state’s soft power ability.
The development of new technologies has further pushed forward this idea of equal
potential for high culture and popular culture as soft power resources. Further promoting this is
the acceptance that power is not something solely exerted by states, but nonstate actors as well
(Nye 1990; Matthews 1997). This in turn recognizes the ability for multinational corporations or
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other firms to utilize soft power (Nye 1990); which is important when considering who is
responsible for creating popular cultural products and who has a stake in their promotion. An
example of this could be a multinational entertainment agency. The ability for nonstate actors to
wield power is also related to the development of new technologies which allow more actors to
have access to information, deteriorating historical information hierarchies that states and elites
previously relied on to assert dominance (Su 2013). This is because before the development of
modern information and communications technologies, states and elites were better able to
maintain a monopoly on information. However, with the emergence of nonstate actors into
power structures, a plethora of actors are now able to communicate their ideas and preferences to
others. While Nye (1990) specifically discusses the potential power of multinational
corporations, this ability can also be extended to the preferences of individuals.
As previously mentioned, pop culture has the ability to reflect the preferences of the
masses (Gans 2008). Therefore, as technology increases information flows and disrupts
information hierarchies, the need for states to strategically utilize a variety of cultural products to
shape the preferences of others becomes more pronounced. But implementing policies and
practices that effectively accomplish this has proven difficult. Additionally, governments’
willingness to recognize the potential power of pop cultural products has lagged, leading to pop
culture becoming an ‘untapped resource’ within states’ soft power initiatives (Schneider 2009).
This in turn has also led to a lack of explicit research on the ways states strategically use cultural
products to increase their soft power capacity. Meanwhile, globalization has allowed
multinational corporations to better utilize popular culture in their own strategies (Nye 1990). As
a result of increased competition between state and nonstate actors, the processes states use to
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strategically achieve their goals have become more convoluted. One of these processes being
public diplomacy.

Public Diplomacy
While historically public diplomacy has been confined to an action performed by states,
the rise of nonstate actors and information technologies has made its practice as well as intended
purpose more complex. Traditionally, public diplomacy was defined as “direct communication
with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and ultimately that of their
governments” (Malone 1985). While this definition does not explicitly identify the type of actor
initiating communication with foreign peoples, at the time there was a strong belief that only
states could use public diplomacy (Gilboa 2008). Eventually, the initiating role of the state
became more explicit as public diplomacy was redefined as “a government’s process of
communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s
ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies, as the
means through which governments would aim to influence foreign peoples’ thinking” (Tuch
1990). According to Gilboa (2008), Frederick (1993) further outlined the activities through
which states could perform public diplomacy, in which the use of cultural activities was clearly
defined. Together, these conceptualizations show public diplomacy as the process through which
states achieve a mutual understanding, noting that the use of cultural activities can be
implemented during this process. However, these early conceptualizations still emphasize the
role of the state as the initiator. Similar to the concept of power, as time progressed public
diplomacy eventually came to be recognized as a process that nonstate actors could also engage
in and with.
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To illustrate this, Signitzer and Coombs (1992) defined public diplomacy as the “way in
which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly the
public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government’s foreign policy
decisions.” While this conceptualization was more inclusive of potential soft power actors, this
definition lacked a clear direction about the objective of public diplomacy tactics. This need for
direction led to public diplomacy being defined as “the process of building long-term
relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies as well as conveying
information and selling a positive image of it” (Leonard, Stead and Smewing 2002).
Much like the progression of soft power research, post-Cold War power shifts have
caused the number and type of actors able to participate in public diplomacy to rapidly expand
(Cooper and Thakur 2013). Now, public diplomacy is a process that nongovernmental
organizations, regional organizations, multinational corporations and private sector firms can
engage in, among others (Cooper and Thakur 2013). Since such a diverse number of actors can
participate in public diplomacy, there has been significant debate about whether the ability to
implement certain public diplomacy tactics are extended to nonstate actors. A debate that has
been very prominent within the study of cultural diplomacy.

Cultural Diplomacy
Broadly speaking, cultural diplomacy can be conceptualized as the exchange of cultural
products between states/individuals to foster a mutual understanding (Cummings 2009). The
ability to foster mutual understanding between different actors is important because it contributes
to the process of building long-term relationships and creating the enabling environment public
diplomacy aims to achieve (Leonard, Stead and Smewing 2002). Cultural diplomacy is a unique
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public diplomacy strategy because it provides human context that policy alone cannot achieve.
Cultural diplomacy is also an accessible public diplomacy strategy because the populations it
reaches are usually those that would not be involved in traditional diplomatic settings (Goff
2013).
An example of cultural diplomacy in action is educational exchange programs between
nations. These experiences allow individuals to experience the culture of a nation up close and
can aid in the process of fostering a mutual understanding between citizens of each nation. The
ability to create mutual understanding then helps contribute to a nation’s overall public
diplomacy goals. In addition, a diverse group of people are often able to participate in
educational exchange programs whereas formal diplomatic exchanges are often limited to the
diplomats themselves. This shows the accessible nature cultural diplomacy can have over other
public diplomacy strategies. However, as noted by Mulcahy (1999) the tactics of cultural
diplomacy are often long-range in nature, making it difficult to measure the short-term success of
cultural diplomacy tactics. But when used effectively and consistently over time, cultural
diplomacy can help build or rebuild relationships between actors. But as argued by Goff (2013),
cultural diplomacy tactics have limited capacity to change policy outcomes.
Considering this, there is benefit for states to use cultural diplomacy to increase the
effectiveness of their long-term public diplomacy strategy. In addition, it is also important to note
that unlike public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is not always a two-way exchange (Cummings
2009). For example, a cultural center promoting language learning would be a form of a one-way
cultural diplomacy tactic since the cultural center would not necessarily be influenced by the
cultural community it exists within. Conversely, educational exchange agreements between states
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are an example of two-way cultural diplomacy since both parties are actively engaging.
Unfortunately, a state’s ability to effectively utilize cultural diplomacy is complex.
The perceived legitimacy of cultural diplomacy is fragile. This is most seen in one-way
cultural diplomacy tactics where a state is actively seeking to share its culture to an audience,
without engaging with the culture of their audience. It is in these instances where the cultural
products utilized in a states’ cultural diplomacy tactic can be perceived as propaganda versus an
attempt at mutual understanding (Feigenbaum 2002). As a result, the cultural product itself is
delegitimized in the eyes of its targeted audience. However, it is difficult to measure what an
appropriate distance between governments and potential cultural products is (Huygens 2008). In
addition, states and the actors behind the creation and promotion of cultural products often have
conflicting goals. While the goal of the state might be to increase cultural awareness, the goal of
a corporation is ultimately to make money. And since both states and nonstate actors can wield
their own power resources, it can be more difficult for states to maintain control in their
relationships with certain nonstate actors.
Further complicating this interaction is mass media. Global television and the internet
have become two of the most effective channels for states to communicate their culture and exert
soft power (Su 2013). However, because of the increase in types of powerful actors, states are
not always able to effectively utilize these channels to achieve their goals. This is where the
potential of pop culture comes into play.
The potential of pop culture within cultural diplomacy has widely been disregarded by
both states and researchers. However, this is also due to an avoidance to the development of
cultural diplomacy tactics as a whole. From the state level, this is partially due to a lack of
existing structures within the state that allow culture to be harnessed into public diplomacy
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endeavors (Cummings 2009; Goff 2013). In addition, measuring the ‘success’ of cultural
diplomacy tactics is difficult because they are long-term strategies (Mulcahy 1999), oftentimes
making their implementation more difficult to justify. As a result, states are often hesitant to
attempt the use of pop cultural diplomacy or further develop cultural diplomacy tactics that are
already in progress. The major exception to this being when there is a perceived threat by the
state (Cummings 2009). However, it is important to note that most of the research on cultural
diplomacy has been conducted about the United States and the models of other states have not
been widely taken into consideration.
But by analyzing instances where states have implemented new cultural diplomacy
tactics, the potential effectiveness of cultural diplomacy can be better understood. Additionally,
the rise of global mass media provides new avenues for researchers to operationalize success of
cultural diplomacy tactics, both in the long-term and short-term.
Pop culture provides a clear outlet for researchers to measure success of these tactics due
to its reliance on media attention to maintain legitimacy (Nye 2008). But as previously
mentioned, the apparent issue for research is prioritizing discussion on whether states will utilize
their pop cultural resources versus analyzing instances where states already are. While this
predicament could be due to a perceived triviality to pop culture amongst scholars, researchers
should not let this perception create an unwillingness to recognize instances where pop cultural
diplomacy is already occurring.
Additional arguments against the use and study of pop cultural diplomacy are that it is
difficult for states to control the agents responsible for cultural products due to the ability for
those agents to wield power. However, this argument assumes that the goals of states and cultural
agents are always conflictual. In fact, sometimes governments and cultural agents can have goals
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that are well-aligned. When this occurs, states will likely be able to exert more control over a
situation or the agents will believe it is in their best interest to go along with the state. Therefore,
by studying how states implement pop cultural diplomacy tactics, we will better be able to
understand the dynamics that play out in relationships between states and nonstate actors, such as
cultural agents.
This is where an examination of idol-state interactions can be helpful. I define idol-state
interactions as an instance where a pop cultural figure accompanies or is accompanied by a state
official to a formal meeting with a representative of a foreign government. Under this definition,
the state retains the initiating power in the interaction between the cultural figure and foreign
government. This aligns with the conceptualization of cultural diplomacy as a state-sponsored
process. At the same time, the definition of idol-state interactions is expansive enough to allow
us to consider instances of cultural diplomacy that are one-way and two-way in nature
(Cummings 2009).
Considering the ability for pop cultural figures to garner media attention, I argue that
idol-state interactions can be used to increase audience for coverage of diplomatic events. This is
because idol-state interactions can be considered as a potential ‘media event’ (Dayan and Katz
1994) because they break the norm of diplomatic interactions between states. The potential for
idol-state interactions to be media events is also supported by studies of celebrity diplomacy.
According to Cooper (2007), while celebrity diplomats often have a greater capacity than states
to redefine norms and other mechanisms of public diplomacy, they often lack the credentials,
credibility or constituency to properly do so. Idol-state interactions alleviate this because they are
instances of state-sponsored celebrity diplomacy, potentially allowing the celebrities involved to
be perceived as more credible. At the same time, idol-state interactions put restrictions on the
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capacity for celebrities to redefine norms. From a control standpoint, this is beneficial to the
state. However, to the benefit of both parties, idol-state interactions still allow a capacity for the
state and celebrity to redefine mechanisms of public diplomacy, because an idol-state interaction
itself is not a traditional method. In turn, idol-state interactions are more likely to garner media
coverage. As a media event, these interactions can then be used to build confidence and gain
public support prior, during or following a diplomatic exchange (Dayan and Katz 1994; Gilboa
2001).
Finally, because idol-state interactions involve pop cultural figures, they still provide an
opportunity for the state to foster a sense of cultural understanding with the foreign party. This is
beneficial to both the state and the idol. For the idol, official recognition by the government of
their cultural value helps blur the lines between pop culture and high culture. This in turn can
help the agents behind cultural figures, such as entertainment agencies, achieve their goals of
increasing the market for their products. For the state, the individual actors within the regime
have the potential to be perceived as though they better understand their constituency since they
are interacting with the cultural products that reflect the preferences of the masses (Gans 2008).
In the age of digital technology, idol-state interactions can also help the state influence mass
media because they utilize popular figures that the media is already prone to covering.
Considering all of this, I argue that idol-state interactions can be used to promote cultural
understanding and increase the audience for coverage of important diplomatic events. As a result
of these two things, idol-state interactions also have the potential to be perceived as a
relationship building tool because of the cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy framework
they operate within.
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Methodology
As mentioned in the previous section, idol-state interactions have the potential to garner
significant media attention. This provides the opportunity for scholars to utilize news coverage to
comprehensively paint a picture of these interactions. By understanding the context within which
these interactions occur, it will be easier to understand the instances in which pop cultural
diplomacy is used.
Using news coverage from the following sources, I compiled two cases about idol-state
interactions. The first case covers idol-state interactions between North and South Korea during
2018. The second case involves idol-state interactions between South Korea and the Trump
administration. In addition to the media outlets listed below, official government press releases
from the Korean Ministry of Unification, Cheong Wa Dae and the U.S. Embassy in South Korea
were used. A description of each media outlet and the justification for its use can be found
below.
● Reuters: An international news provider based in London, Reuters reports on
global events across various industries. Reuters is a signatory to the International
Fact-Checking Network through the Poynter Institute. Many of their articles are
available for free and translated into several languages. Within international
relations research, Reuters articles are often used for international event analysis
research via the Integrated Data for Event Analysis. For this exploratory
qualitative content analysis, Reuters was selected for its factual reporting with
little accompanying analysis as well as their wide international scope.
● The Associated Press: An American-based newswire service, The Associated
Press is an independent global news organization. According to their website, The
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Associated Press operates in 250 locations worldwide. Like Reuters, they are
signatories to the International Fact-Checking Network through the Poynter
Institute. The Associated Press was selected for its factual reporting with little
accompanying analysis and accessibility.
● Yonhap News Agency: Based in Seoul, Yonhap News is a news agency that
provides information on South Korea’s domestic and foreign affairs. Yonhap News
was selected due to their large amount of English-language content with limited
analysis.
● The Korea Herald: According to their website, The Korea Herald is the number
one English newspaper in South Korea. In addition, The Korea Herald is affiliated
to several other English publications including the KPOP Herald which reports
exclusively on K-Pop. The Korea Herald is the only South Korean publication
that is a member of the Asia News Network, a regional media coalition of
English-language newspapers from across Asia. The Korea Herald was selected
for their English-language content, in-depth reporting and accessibility of articles.
● The New York Times: Based in New York City, The New York Times was selected
to show a comprehensive American perspective of idol-state interactions that
other publications might be unable to illustrate.
● The South China Morning Post: Based in Hong Kong, SCMP is an
English-language newspaper. This publication was selected to show a larger
Asian perspective of idol-state interactions. The publication also has a dedicated
K-Pop section.
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● Billboard: An American-based weekly magazine that reports on events related to
the global music industry. Billboard is known for its music charts such as the Hot
100, Billboard 200, Global 200 and Social 50. Additionally, Billboard has a
dedicated K-Pop section known as ‘K-Town.’ Billboard was selected for an
industry-specific perspective on idol-state interactions.

Along with news articles, videos from verified YouTube channels were used when news
coverage was not sufficient or possible. The YouTube channels include KBS World TV and
Arirang TV. KBS World TV is owned by the Korean Broadcasting System and often provides
English translations of segments from their Korean-language channels. Similarly, Arirang TV is
an English-language South Korean television network that is owned by the Korean International
Broadcasting Foundation (KIBF). Arirang TV has been the main operating body for international
broadcasting designated by the South Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports & Tourism since 1998.
A total of 63 articles and videos were used to compile the two case studies. General
coverage was condensed to events that occurred after the election of South Korean President
Moon Jae-in on May 10, 2017. However, 3 articles published before his election were used to
provide context for specific events. The rest of the articles span from May 21, 2017 to January
21, 2021. Only interactions where a K-Pop idol and a South Korean government official jointly
interacted with a foreign head of state or foreign government official were considered while
compiling each case. Interactions were limited to K-Pop idols versus Korean actors due to the
amount of news outlets that have sections dedicated to K-Pop. Upon conclusion of initial
research, I divided idol-state interactions into two categories: those between North and South
Korea, and those between South Korea and the United States. Idol-state interactions that did not
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fit into these categories or were significant but did not completely adhere to my
conceptualization of idol-state interactions are briefly discussed in the ‘Additional Findings’
section.
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Case I: Idol-State Interactions with North Korea
In early April 2018, pictures of K-Pop idol group Red Velvet with North Korean leader
Kim Jong-un went viral after a historic musical performance by South Korean artists in
Pyongyang. Less than a month after the performance, Kim Jong-un would cross the North-South
border to meet with President Moon Jae-in during the 2018 Inter-Korean Summit, a feat never
before accomplished by a North Korean leader. This case will provide an overview of the events
surrounding the meeting between Red Velvet and Kim, as well as the subsequent Inter-Korean
Summit in September 2018. While this case aligns more closely with traditional
conceptualizations of cultural diplomacy, it also shows the ways pop cultural exchanges can be
used to indicate a diplomatic commitment to an otherwise strenuous relationship.

‘Spring is Coming’ Performance in Pyongyang:
On March 20, 2018, the South Korean Ministry of Unification5 announced in a press
release that a 160-member art troupe would visit Pyongyang, North Korea from March 31 to
April 3. While there, the troupe would hold two performances.6 Famous Korean trot singers Cho
Yong-pil, Lee Sunhee and Choi Jin-hee would be members of the troupe, alongside rock singer
Yoon Do-hyun, balladist Baek Z-young, former idol-group singer Seohyun, and K-Pop girl group
Red Velvet. As a whole, the members of the performance troupe would encompass several
generations of Korean music. Domestically, all attention was on Cho Yong-pil, who had been the
last South Korean singer to perform in North Korea during a solo concert in 2005.7 Meanwhile,

5

The South Korean Ministry of Unification is responsible for all events and communications with North
Korea.
6
Ministry of Unification. 2018 March 20. “Joint Press Release of Inter-Korean Working-Level Contact
Regarding Art Troupe’s Pyeongyang Performance. [Press Release]
7
Kim, Christine. 2018 March 20. “South Korea to Send K-Pop Singers to Pyongyang in Late March.”
Reuters.
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domestic and international attention was on Red Velvet because this event was set to occur as the
group continued to achieve record-breaking international success. Not only would Red Velvet be
the only idol group to perform, but also the youngest members of the troupe and sole
representatives of the increasingly global K-Pop industry.
Before the troupe departed for North Korea, the music director and chief delegate for the
art troupe, Lee Yoon-sang, said, “Our goal is to impress North Koreans in the same way as South
Koreans are moved by their musicians.”8
Lee’s appointment to chief delegate for the troupe also represented the first time an
entertainer had represented South Korea during inter-Korean talks.9 In this role, Lee was
responsible for planning the entire troupe’s performance and coordinating with the North Korean
representative. While Lee’s appointment was likely due to his past experience planning elaborate
musical performances in a short amount of time, his appointment also helped distance the
performance from the South Korean government. Instead of the performance troupe being
perceived as a direct extension of a South Korean propaganda campaign, it appeared more as an
artist-to-artist exchange with the aim of creating friendlier relations on the Korean peninsula. The
attempt to illustrate the performance as a sincere artistic exchange was also supported by North
Korea’s appointment of Hyon Song-wol as their delegate in the working-talks with the South.
Similar to Lee, Hyon was not a government official, but instead, the leader of the North Korean
Moranbong Band.10

8

Kim, Soo Yeon. 2018 March 20. “S. Korea to Send 160-Member Art Troupe to N.K. for Concerts.”
Yonhap News Agency.
9
Ibid.
10
The Moranbong Band is often labeled as North Korea’s answer to the global popularity of K-Pop. They
are known for their ‘Western-stye’ songs and performances. More can be found at Ock, Hyun-ju. 2018
January 15. “[Newsmaker] Hyon Song-Wol, Moranbong Band Leader and More.”
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While the overall announcement of South Korean musicians performing in North Korea
might appear out of place, when put in the context of other North-South events at the time, it is
clear that the concert was meant to signify the thawing of North-South relations. This intention
was even more explicit given the official theme of the concert, “Spring is Coming.”
In February, North and South Korea had achieved historic cooperation during the 2018
Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang, South Korea. During the Olympics, the two countries
competed together under a joint Korean women’s hockey team. In addition, during the opening
ceremony athletes from both countries marched alongside one another under the Korean
unification flag.11 As for cultural exchange, the North Korean Samjiyon Orchestra held several
performances in Seoul in the nights leading up to the opening ceremony.
The orchestra’s performances signified the first time the North had sent an art troupe to
South Korea since 2002.12 According to a Ministry of Unification press release, over 1,000 South
Korean citizens were invited to participate in a lottery for the chance to attend one of the
orchestra’s performances.13 Of which, more than 150,000 South Koreans entered.14 South Korean
President Moon Jae-in, Kim Yo-jong (the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un), and the
constitutional North Korean head of state Kim Yong-nam also attended one of the performances
together.15 Their presence at the orchestra’s performance and subsequent Olympic games marked
the first time the constitutional North Korean head of state and a family member of the North
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Korean leader had visited South Korea.16 During the performance, Seohyun, a former member
from girl-group Girls’ Generation 17 also made a surprise appearance and sang a popular song
about Korean unification alongside the singers from North Korea.18
Therefore, the announcement of the South Korean art troupe’s trip to Pyongyang
appeared to be a reciprocal action in response to the orchestra’s performance, as well as an
attempt to further improve the North-South relationship. To further support this, days before the
troupe was set to depart for Pyongyang, the Ministry of Unification announced that the 2018
Inter-Korean Summit would occur on April 27 within the Demilitarized Zone.19 While the idea of
a summit between the two Koreas had been previously discussed during talks about the North’s
participation in the Olympics, the exact details of any summit were not announced until days
before the performance troupe left for Pyongyang. In addition, heightened tensions between
North Korea and the United States over the North’s missile tests served as the backdrop for
North-South events to occur. Together, these events signified South Korea’s attempt to
diplomatically ease the tension between the United States and North Korea, or at the very least a
willingness for North Korea to open up to the rest of the world.
Leading up to the South Korean troupe’s performance in Pyongyang, there was no
mention of which North Korea officials would be in attendance. So, it was a surprise to the
international community when North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his wife showed up to the
concert. Kim’s attendance marked the first time a North Korean leader had attended a South

16

Ministry of Unification. 2018 February 11. “Explanation of North Korean High-Level Delegation Visit to
the Republic of Korea.”
17
Girls’ Generation is one of the most well-known second-generation K-Pop groups. During the height of
the group’s success, they were dubbed “The Nation’s Girl Group.” They are best known for their song
“Gee.”
18
Chang, Dong-woo. 2018 March 20. “From Classic to Cutting-Edge, Seoul Seeks Balance in Pyongyang
K-Pop Shows.” Yonhap News Agency.
19
Ministry of Unification. 2018 March 29. “Joint Press Release of High-Level Talks for 2018 Inter-Korean
Summit.” [Press Release]

20

Korean artistic performance.20 During the performance, Kim sat alongside the South Korean
Cultural Minister Do Jong-hwan. Pictures from before the performance show the two shaking
hands.21 While Do was the official government representative for South Korea during the event,
his presence and role in orchestrating the event was not heavily reported on. Instead, most of the
focus was on the artists and their meeting with Kim. However, there were multiple reports that
Do said Kim enjoyed the South Koreans’ performance, as well as videos of Kim clapping during
the concert.22 North Korean state media also confirmed that Kim enjoyed the performance.
“Our dear leader comrade said his heart swelled and he was moved by the sight of his
people deepen their understanding of South Korean popular culture and cheer with sincerity,”
North Korean KCNA state media said, according to a Reuters article.23
When the performance was over, Kim met with all of the members of the South Korean
troupe. Following this, an image of Kim talking with the members of Red Velvet was widely
circulated. As a result, news outlets dubbed Kim as a superfan of the five-member girl-group.24
Red Velvet was the fifth idol group to perform in North Korea. Prior to their
performance, boy-group Sechs Kies and girl-group Fin.K.L had performed in 1999. A few years
later in 2003, another concert occurred featuring girl-group Baby Vox and boy-group Shinhwa.25
Leading up to the departure of the 2018 performance troupe, it was unclear how North Koreans
would respond to the music of Red Velvet due to the amount of ‘loanwords’26 in their lyrics, their
20
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fashion style and choreography. In the days leading up to their performance, the members of
Shinhwa publicly wished Red Velvet good luck with the performance. In 2003, the members of
Shinhwa had prepared a ‘powerful’ song and dance number only to be met with no response
from their North Korean audience, creating what was described as an ‘awkward situation’ for the
artists.27 In addition, prior to the performance troupe’s departure, there was public debate about if
Psy, an idol known for the global hit “Gangnam Style,” should be included in the troupe.
Ultimately, no additional idol singers were added to the setlist in order to avoid creating any
awkwardness between the South Korean artists and North Korean audience.28 However, other
news outlets reported the North had flatout rejected the addition of Psy to the setlist.29
Considering the previous lackluster responses to K-Pop idols in the North, the picture with Kim
and Red Velvet signaled that K-Pop was something that could be enjoyed by North Koreans, as
well as a fundamental component of South Korean cultural diplomacy.
During the performance, the members of Red Velvet sang their songs “Red Flavor” and
“Bad Boy.” While “Red Flavor” is more of a bubblegum pop track30 about love during the
summer, the song “Bad Boy” is an R&B-inspired track with sultry lyrics and choreography.
According to an article from Yonhap News, these songs were selected because they were the
most recent releases from the group at the time.31 However, it is important to note that before
their performance in Pyongyang, both of these songs played a major role in the group’s
international success and global spread of K-Pop. A month before the performance in
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Pyongyang, the song “Bad Boy” had earned the group the number 2 spot on Billboard’s World
Digital Song Sales chart.32 This win occurred alongside the group’s entry into the top 10 of
Billboard’s Social 50 chart,33 which ranks global artists’ social media activity and engagement.34
Additionally, less than a week after their performance in Pyongyang, Red Velvet performed
alongside boy-group EXO in Dubai. The concert in Dubai was the first S.M. Entertainment
concert to be held in the Middle East.35 Together, these events signify the increasingly global
popularity of Red Velvet and K-Pop at the time.
Therefore, Kim’s vocal approval of Red Velvet was surprising to many, especially when
considering the criminalization of South Korean pop cultural products in North Korea. Before
the 2018 performance, Kim had previously called South Korean pop culture products poor
attempts by the South at “decadent capitalist influence.”36
In addition, K-Pop had previously been used as a propaganda tool by the South Korean
military at the DMZ. During occasions of increased tension between the countries, the South
Korean military would play songs by famous idol groups like Girls’ Generation and BIGBANG
nonstop on loudspeakers aimed at the North.37 While the loudspeakers were turned off following
an agreement made in 2015, they were turned back on in response to the North’s nuclear tests in
early 2016. Based on news coverage about the loudspeakers, it is reasonable to assume that they
were still being used at the DMZ at the same time Kim was meeting with the South Korean
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performance troupe. Creating a situation where a song by Girls’ Generation could have been
blasting through loudspeakers at the DMZ while Kim met with Seohyun, a former member of
Girls’ Generation and the designated host during the South Korean performances in Pyongyang.
In addition, Kim was reported to have said that the South and North should hold cultural
and arts performances more frequently.38 Following the “Spring is Coming” performance, Kim
reportedly suggested the countries hosting another concert in the fall with the theme of ‘Autumn
has come’ to signify the development of the relationship between the two countries.39
While it is unclear if the performance was televised in North Korea, the entire event was
broadcasted on MBC, a public South Korean cable channel owned by the Munhwa Broadcasting
Corporation.40 MBC is well-known for its international reach as well as a K-Pop TV program
called “Show! Music Core.” As a result, Red Velvet’s performance was uploaded onto the
official MBC K-Pop YouTube channel, expanding the performances’ international reach. 41
In the weeks following the Pyongyang performances, attention shifted to the 2018
Inter-Korean Summit between President Moon and Kim Jong-un. The April 27 meeting would
be the first of three meetings between the Korean leaders in 2018, all of which would focus on
the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the North’s relationship with the United States.
By itself, the April summit was a historic occasion because it was the first time a North Korean
leader stepped over the dividing line into South Korea. News coverage from the event shows
Kim and Moon shaking hands before Moon invites Kim onto the Southern border. After crossing
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over into the South, Kim in turn invited Moon to step into North Korea.42 Both countries also
gave a joint-statement where they agreed to the “the common goal of realizing, through complete
denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.”43 While no concrete plans were given about
how both countries would approach denuclearization, the announcement appeared to be a
positive sign that the relationship between the two countries would continue to thaw.
Also at the forefront of the summit was the countries’ participation in the 2018 Asian
Games. During the summit, both countries agreed to participate in certain events with a joint
Korean team as well as have their athletes march as a unified Korean during the opening and
closing ceremony, in a fashion similar to the 2018 Winter Olympic Games.44 As a sign of
commitment to their agreed-upon goals, in the days following the meeting between the two
Korean leaders it was reported that the loudspeakers at the DMZ border would be dismantled,45
effectively ending an era of K-Pop as propaganda.

Analysis
Several themes can be taken away from this case, the first being the use of pop cultural
figures in conjunction with sporting events. Since culture is not monolithic, it makes sense for
the South Korean government to employ different cultural products at once. Considering the
timing of these events leading up to and following the 2018 Winter Olympic Games, one could
argue that the winter games served as a foundation for several types of cultural diplomacy to
occur. This is because while much of the focus at the Olympics is on sports, it is also often a time
42
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for a country to showcase their culture: both traditional and popular. This was represented in the
use of high-tech robots alongside traditional Korean dances in the opening and closing
ceremonies of the Olympics. Since both Koreas share a common cultural heritage, the Olympics
helped create a common ground between each country. As a result, the Olympics provided a
platform for the two countries to showcase their shared culture. In addition, participation in
sports is something that connects both Koreas beyond cultural heritage. While the unified
women’s hockey team was the most overt example of sports diplomacy, several sporting events
occurred alongside the concerts in Pyongyang.
While drastically less publicized, a South Korean taekwondo team traveled to North
Korea alongside the performance troupe. The day after the concert with Red Velvet and Kim
Jong-un, the South Korean taekwondo team gave several demonstrations to a North Korean
audience.46 Considering the popularity of taekwondo across the Korean peninsula, this choice of
sport was symbolic in itself because taekwondo embodies both sport and Korean culture.
Structurally speaking, it also makes sense for the South Korean government to use cultural
events alongside sporting events because the promotion of these activities falls under the same
government agency: The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. In contrast, other states do not
always have an agency that overlooks the promotion of culture. This aligns well with scholarship
on how cultural diplomacy is a long-term process (Mulcahy 1999) that can flourish when there
are systems that support its use (Cummings 2009). When considering all these factors, the theme
of cultural diplomacy alongside sports diplomacy makes sense.
Another interesting aspect of this idol-state interaction is the appointment of Lee Yoon
Sang as the chief delegate during the working-talks with the North. A common argument against
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the use of cultural diplomacy is that it can put the reputations of ‘cultural agents’ such as actors,
musicians and artists at-risk for their proximity to government officials (Feigenbaum 2002). The
appointment of Lee helped frame the event as an artist-to-artist interaction versus one that was
under strict government control. While the Cultural Minister accompanied the South Korean
performance troupe to Pyongyang, a lot of the new coverage about these events used Lee as the
point of contact instead of the state official. As a result, this event was something both the South
Korean government and the artists involved could take pride in and/or claim responsibility for.
The comprehensive lineup of musicians involved in the Pyongyang concert was another
interesting aspect of this idol-state interaction. Traditionally, diplomatic cultural performances
have been aimed at the promotion of ‘high culture’ (Nye 2008; Goff 2013). Even the Samjiyon
Orchestra’s performance in Seoul could be seen as an event aimed at high culture. This is
because the orchestra performed mostly traditional North Korean music and the performers
themselves were dressed in traditional hanbok before changing to formal ball gowns. In contrast,
the South Korean performance troupe included music from all genres including ballads, trot,
rock and K-Pop. While on one hand the musical lineup could be seen as an attempt to appeal to
North Koreans of all ages, at the same time such a comprehensive lineup likely helped increase
the international and domestic audience for the event. Further supporting this is the fact the
concert was broadcast in South Korea on MBC. By including artists from several generations of
Korean music and broadcasting their performances on a public channel, it increased the
accessibility and reach of the performance. Had the lineup only included Korean trot singers, it is
likely that only a specific South Korean demographic would have watched the broadcast.
As previously mentioned, following the broadcast on MBC performances from the
concert were uploaded onto the official MBC K-Pop YouTube channel. By doing this, the event
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was able to reach a larger international audience because people from all over the world were
able to watch Red Velvet perform in Pyongyang and see the reactions of North Koreans. This in
turn likely helped humanize the citizens of North Korea. Going along with this, the titles of the
performance videos uploaded onto the MBC K-Pop channel did not directly mention North
Korea or Pyongyang. Instead, the videos were titled with the word ‘harmony’ followed by the
name of the performer, the song and the title of the concert, ‘Spring is Coming.’ For example, the
official title of the Red Velvet performance video is “[HARMONY] Red Velvet - ‘Red Flavor’
@Spring is Coming 20180405.” While this might appear as a strange title for a video, it is
important to note that this is the same format MBC K-Pop uses for all its videos, and it is often
written in both Korean and English. However, the titles of the performance videos from the
Pyongyang concert were only written in English. This could signify an attempt to showcase the
presence of K-Pop in North Korea directly to non-Korean speaking audiences while
simultaneously desensationalizing North Korea.
The inclusion of Red Velvet during a record-breaking year for the group likely helped
garner more media attention to the event. From my own exploratory analysis, it was difficult to
find a headline about the concert that did not mention Red Velvet or K-Pop. From a publisher’s
perspective, it would make sense to include Red Velvet in headlines given the group’s highly
engaged following on social media (as proven by their ranking on the Billboard Social 50 chart).
The use of Red Velvet coupled with the timeliness of the Pyongyang performance immediately
following the 2018 Winter Olympics (where K-Pop was also showcased on the global stage),
likely helped garner more attention to Inter-Korean relations. However, formal media monitoring
research would have to be conducted to confirm this.
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Looking at this idol-state interaction from the perspective of a political strategist, when
considering the inflammatory dialogue that was occurring between North Korea and the United
States during this time, it would make sense for the South Korean government to increase
awareness about their efforts at public diplomacy with the North. The domestic dynamics of
South Korea politics are also important to consider. Both the Olympics and Inter-Korean Summit
occurred before President Moon finished his first year in the office. Considering Moon came into
power as the first democratic candidate in ten years following a major corruption scandal under
the Park administration, it would make sense for Moon to want to reassert South Korea’s image
on the global stage. In addition, as a democratic candidate whose parents were North Korean
refugees, Moon heavily campaigned on a platform of peaceful relations with the North.
Therefore, his apparent willingness to form a diplomatic relationship with Kim Jong-un in spite
of the United States makes sense.
Additionally, the election of Moon was well aligned with the increased global popularity
of K-Pop. Less than two weeks after Moon assumed office in 2017, K-Pop group BTS won the
Top Social Artist award at the Billboard Music Awards. 47 The award is solely dependent on
social media fan interactions and engagement. By winning this award, BTS helped legitimize the
power K-Pop groups often have on social media. Considering the importance of modern
technology to boosting soft power (Nye 1990; Matthews 1997; Su 2013), BTS’ win at the awards
show was not only a milestone for how popular K-Pop had become but a representation of K-Pop
as a soft power resource. Recognizing this, it would make sense for Red Velvet, a group with a
massive, international following on social media, to be included in a historic cultural exchange
with North Korea. If not as an attempt to increase awareness about the thaw in Korean relations
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but to further legitimize the global power of K-Pop. A power that was only further legitimized
when praised by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
However, the perceived acceptance of K-Pop by Kim could also be viewed as an attempt
for him to earn credibility. Several news articles argued that Kim could have likely only attended
the concert in an attempt to get sanctions against North Korea lifted. This signifies the potential
downside of using pop cultural diplomacy. This is because pop cultural diplomacy is relational in
nature, allowing both the initiator and receiver to get different things out of its use. Regardless of
Kim’s motivations for attending the concert, the picture of him with the members of Red Velvet
signifies the potential role pop culture can play in public diplomacy. And if not the picture, the
headlines that dubbed the North Korean Supreme Leader as a K-Pop superfan certainly do.

Subsequent Idol-State Interactions with North Korea
Following the April meeting between President Moon and Kim Jong-un, international
attention shifted to the proposed US-North Korean talks. However, South Korea’s efforts at
sports diplomacy did not stop. In August, the two Koreas competed as a unified team during
several events in the 2018 Asian Games in Indonesia. 48 Similar to the Winter Olympic Games,
the Koreas joint participation in the Asian Games helped set the stage for attempts at pop cultural
diplomacy. During the games, it was announced that Moon would visit North Korea for another
Inter-Korean summit by the end of September. On September 18, 2018 Moon arrived in
Pyongyang. While the focus of the summit was on denuclearization and improving relations on
the Korean peninsula, attention was also cast towards the entourage Moon brought with him to
the North.
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During his visit, Moon brought a 52-person group of business leaders, government
officials, community figures and K-Pop idols. The idols included Zico, a prominent rapper and
member of boy-group Block B, as well as R&B singer Ailee and balladist ALi. 49 Interestingly,
none of the three idols belonged to the ‘big three’ South Korean entertainment agencies. Instead,
all three artists were known for their music producing or songwriting abilities.
According to The Korea Herald, the presidential chief of staff Im Jong-seok said, “We
hope that the ‘harmony of peace’ drawn up by the three of them [Zico, Ailee and ALi] will
depict the fruitful autumn that is the Inter-Korean relations.”50 In itself, this statement alludes
back to comments made by Kim Jong-un during the April performance about hosting an
‘Autumn has come’ concert.
However, unlike the earlier concerts in Pyongyang, the September performances by the
K-Pop artists were met with much less fanfare and media coverage. Instead of a grand concert,
the idols reportedly performed at a dinner banquet.51 During which, Zico performed his hip hop
track titled ‘Artist.’ Leading up to the trip, there had been concern about how Zico’s music would
resonate with the North Korean audience. Similar to Red Velvet, his lyrics include a lot of
loanwords from English that could be unfamiliar to North Koreans. But upon returning to the
South, Zico said that his performance was met with a good response.
"Usually, I ad lib 'put your hands up' (in English) in the middle of performance,” Zico
said in an interview with Yonhap News Agency. “But I replaced it with 'raise your hands' (in
Korean) and the North Korean participants did put their hands above their heads."52
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Based on media coverage, it was unclear how Kim Jong-un reacted to the idols’
performance. As representatives of various genres of South Korean music, the role of the idols
was to reportedly introduce their respective genres to North Koreans.53 However, video coverage
of the idols’ performance during the dinner banquet was limited, with only a poorly filmed,
one-minute video of Zico’s performance being made public.54 However, one video that did come
out of the Inter-Korean Summit was a video of ALi singing “Arirang,” a classic Korean folk
song, at Mt. Baekdu in front of Kim, Moon and their wives.55 Despite the symbolism of the song
and the mountain, the public performance was not reported on by international media outlets.
Since global mass media is one of the most effective channels for a state to share its culture (Su
2013), the lack of coverage by international news sources about this performance signifies a
missed opportunity for Moon to globally showcase this historic moment in Inter-Korean
relations.
Besides performing at the dinner banquet, the idols also attended North Korean cultural
events, including a gymnastics show56 and a luncheon at a famous cold noodle restaurant in
Pyongyang.57 While the gymnastics show was something the South Korean performance troupe
in April did not get to witness, the artists in April were able to eat the infamous North Korean
cold noodles at a local Pyongyang restaurant. But unlike Red Velvet, the September artists that
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did not have any pictures taken with Kim Jong-un. Similarly, Kim Jong-un did not make any
public statements about the idols during the summit.
Considering all of this, while it is clear that the idol-state interaction promoted cultural
exchange between the two states, the North Korean perceptions of that exchange are uncertain.
In contrast, Zico conducted several interviews with media outlets upon returning to South Korea
where he talked fondly about his experience in the North. Given the lack of media coverage
about the artists leading up to and during the summit, it is reasonable to assume that the role of
the idols in September was not to boost awareness about events occurring between the North and
South. This could also be supported by the lack of videos from the artists’ performance and
international media coverage.
When looking at idol-state interactions from the perspective of a relationship-building
tool, the presence of ALi on the trip makes more sense. This is because ALi was also a member
of the performance troupe in April and as a result, had previously met Kim Jong-un.
Additionally, the only full performance-related video from the September summit was of ALi
singing “Arirang” at Mt. Baekdu in front of both Kim and Moon. Therefore, the strategy of
bringing along an idol who has already met Kim could be a relationship-building tactic. But due
to the lack of expansive media coverage, there is limited evidence to support this.
Instead, it appears that the three idols were influenced more by the exposure to North
Korean culture versus their capacity to share South Korean culture to North Koreans. This hints
at the limitations of pop cultural diplomacy in certain diplomatic settings. Had the three artists
performed in Pyongyang prior to the beginning of the summit, they might have had more fanfare.
But because their presence overlapped with the higher priority talks of denuclearization, they did
not appear to fully fulfil their intended role.
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Case II: Idol-State Interactions with the United States
Following the closing ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang,
the official Twitter account for K-Pop boy-group EXO tweeted a photo. In it, the members of
EXO stood alongside South Korean President Moon Jae-in, First Lady Kim Jung-Sook, fellow
idol singer CL and Ivanka Trump - senior White House adviser and daughter of U.S. President
Donald Trump. The caption to the photo read:
“It was a great pleasure to meet President Moon, First Lady Kim, and Ms. Ivanka Trump
at the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics Closing Ceremony! Hope everyone enjoyed our
performance! Thank you very much for your love and support for K-POP and EXO!”58
Prior to meeting with Ms. Trump, CL and EXO had performed in the closing ceremony
as the official Olympic representatives of the K-Pop industry. While not much context was given
to the photo of the idols with Trump, several news outlets reported that Trump had requested to
meet them after she told Moon her daughter was a K-Pop fan.59
Besides Ivanka Trump, the only other individual EXO was reported to have met after the
closing ceremony was Russian figure skater Evgenia Medvedeva.60 At the beginning of the
winter games, Medvedeva gained attention after she revealed herself to be an EXO superfan and
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K-Pop listener.61 But overall, the picture with Trump and the idols appeared to be an informal
idol-state interaction.
In light of the preparations the Moon administration was making for Trump’s official visit
to South Korea for the closing ceremony, several news outlets reported how unusual it was for a
family member of the U.S. President to receive such fanfare.62 At the same time, it was believed
that there was heightened hospitality towards Trump given the public tension between U.S. Vice
President Mike Pence and North Korea’s Kim Yo-jong during the opening ceremony. There were
also concerns that the U.S. should receive the same level of hospitality as North Korea so as not
to upset. This makes sense considering that at the time, the Moon administration had taken on the
role of mediating dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea about denuclearization. In
addition, others perceived the arrival of Ivanka Trump as the U.S. response to Kim Yo-jong.
After all, upon her arrival in South Korea, Kim Yo-jong was quickly labeled as “North Korea’s
Ivanka.”63
While there is no accessible video footage of the meeting between Trump and the idols, it
was reported that EXO gifted Trump several items related to Korean culture.64 When examining
this particular idol-state interaction, it can be viewed from a relationship-building perspective.
Whether or not Ivanka Trump’s daughter is a K-Pop fan, a photo of the daughter of the U.S.
President alongside the South Korean President and one of the number one K-Pop groups of all
time makes a statement. On one hand, this statement could be seen as an attempt by Trump to
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show the United States’ approval of South Korean pop cultural goods. On the other hand, upon
discovering Ivanka was a K-Pop fan, the photo could have represented a larger political strategy
by Moon to promote the legitimacy of K-Pop. From a public relations perspective, a photo of an
American government official alongside one of the most successful K-Pop groups is a much
better photo depicting the U.S. government at the winter games, compared to earlier photos of
Vice President Pence remaining seated at the opening ceremony during the entrance of the
unified Korean team.65
Following this encounter at the Olympics, there were limited idol-state interactions with
the United States. Throughout the rest of 2018, the U.S. and South Korea focused on meeting
with North Korean officials to discuss denuclearization. All of the US-South Korean interactions
about denuclearization occurred alongside South Korea’s pop cultural diplomacy towards the
North, as previously discussed. Following the Olympics, official talks between South Korea and
the United States took place outside of South Korea.
It was not until June 29, 2019, when the U.S. President Donald Trump visited South
Korea again. His visit lasted two days following a summit with other world leaders in Japan and
was announced after a letter exchange about potentially meeting with North Korea’s Kim
Jong-un.66 Prior to Trump’s arrival, news coverage was focused on whether Trump would meet
with Kim while in the South. However, upon his arrival, news coverage quickly shifted. That is
because when Trump arrived at Cheong Wa Dae for a welcome dinner with President Moon, a
familiar K-Pop group was there to greet him: EXO.
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While the presence of EXO at the official welcome dinner between Moon and Trump
seemed strange, it was reported that EXO was invited to greet officials from the Trump
administration because of their previous meeting with Ivanka.67 In addition to EXO, South
Korean golf coach Pak Se-ri was also present. Once again, illustrating South Korea’s ability to
use pop cultural diplomacy in conjunction with sports diplomacy. This was because Pak was
reported to have been invited given President Trump’s affinity for golf.68
Before dinner was served, an official photo of the occasion was taken. In it is President
Trump, President Moon, First Lady Kim, Ivanka Trump, Jared Kushner, U.S. Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin, four additional members of the
Moon administration and of course, EXO.69 The idols also gave three signed copies of their
album to the U.S. delegation: one to President Trump, and two to Ivanka (so she could give a
copy to her daughter).70
While this idol-state interaction appears more symbolic in nature, the presence of EXO
also likely contributed to the level of media coverage given to the event. As a political strategy,
this could have been a small way for the Moon administration to reassert itself in news coverage
about the potential meeting between President Trump and Kim Jong-un. Additionally, the
presence of EXO further legitimized the global power of K-Pop as if to show, “even the
granddaughter of the U.S. President listens to K-Pop.” Given the amount of coverage the
welcome dinner received compared to previous welcome dinners, this idol-state interaction
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illustrates the ability for pop cultural diplomacy to increase audience. Finally, allowing Ivanka
Trump to meet again with EXO further solidified their own relationship and shows the potential
for pop culture figures to be used as a relationship-building tool. However, it will be interesting
to see if Ivanka Trump attends an EXO concert with her daughter in the future as well as if this
relationship extends beyond the Trump administration.

Additional Findings
Additional findings from this exploratory study show the need to expand the scope of
idol-state interactions. For example, on his first state visit to China, President Moon brought
three members of EXO and actress Song Hye-kyo from the popular 2016 Korean drama,
“Descendants of the Sun.”71 While the members of EXO were only present at a business event,
Song attended a dinner with Moon and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The presence of K-Pop idols
was widely seen as a representation of Moon’s intention to achieve friendlier trade relations with
China.72 However, it is interesting that the members of EXO were only present at a business
event where Xi was not in attendance.
This “attempted” idol-state interaction occurred while South Korean pop cultural goods
were still being blocked and targeted in China due to South Korea’s alignment with the United
States on THAAD, an anti-missile defense system.73 The presence of Song was particularly
interesting because her drama, “Descendants of the Sun” achieved great success in China.74
However, its success was also likely due to the fact the drama aired before the South Korean
71
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government formally approved the deployment of THAAD in 2016. Regardless, the choice of
EXO and Song for Moon’s state visit seemed to be very intentional. On one hand, EXO was
representative of an industry that had lost a large portion of its Chinese market as a result of the
THAAD fallout.75 On the other hand, Song appeared to represent the success the Korean wave
had achieved in China before the dispute over THAAD. However, more research should be
conducted about this topic.
In addition to expanding the scope of idol-state interactions, my findings also saw the
need for examining ‘idol-driven’ interactions. These are instances where a pop culture figure
meets a representative of a foreign government, but a state official from their home country is not
necessarily present or does not arrange the meeting. An example of this is the speech BTS gave
at the United Nations on Sept. 24, 2018. While the focus of the BTS speech was about their
campaign with UNICEF and promoting confidence and individuality amongst youth,76 President
Moon was also present at the United Nations. At the same time BTS gave their speech, Moon
met with U.S. President Donald Trump to discuss North Korea’s denuclearization.77 Therefore,
the speech appears to be a BTS-driven interaction that happened to occur in the same place
where Moon was present. This is further supported by media coverage about BTS meeting Moon
for the first time after performing at a French-South Korean friendship concert in October.78
While idol-driven interactions might coincide with state events, these interactions can also
provide insight for conceptualizing ‘celebrity diplomacy.’ Afterall, BTS was the first K-Pop
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group to speak at the United Nations. But to understand the weight of idol-driven interactions
versus idol-state interactions, more research should be conducted.
My research also found that direct idol-state interactions were only utilized in certain
circumstances. For example, when President Moon travelled to Indonesia on his first state visit,
no K-Pop idols came along despite his 200-person delegation of business leaders.79 This is
interesting considering how popular K-Pop is in Indonesia and how active Indonesian K-Pop
fans are on social media.80 Had Moon included a K-Pop idol as a member of his delegation, it is
not unreasonable to assume it would have garnered a lot of attention. However, K-Pop was not
completely absent during Moon’s visit to Indonesia. According to The Jakarta Post, Moon gave
a signed EXO album and video message from SHINee’s Choi Min-ho to the daughter of
Indonesian President Joko Widodo.81 This was because Widodo’s daughter was known to be an
avid K-Pop fan and had just gotten married. But considering the meeting between Ivanka Trump
and EXO, it is interesting that no idol was present with Moon during his visit to Indonesia. This
could indicate the limitations of idol-state interactions and their ability to be used in countries
that do not neighbor the home state. It is also important to note the number of foreign officials
who visited South Korea and were not greeted by K-Pop idols, potentially indicating that idols
are only used in certain circumstances or to ease politically tense relationships. But once again,
more research should be conducted by expanding the scope of idol-state interactions to include
actors. This is because while numerous foreign officials were not greeted by K-Pop idols upon
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their arrival in South Korea, it is unclear if representatives from other pop cultural products were
present instead.
Lastly, the level of reported idol-state interactions seemed to change annually under the
Moon administration. While this was partially due to the Olympics and historic Inter-Korean
summits occurring during Moon’s first year in office, it is interesting to see how the South
Korean government has utilized K-Pop over time. In a previous section, it was mentioned that
cultural diplomacy is a tactic that should be used over a long period of time to garner results.
Therefore, more research should be conducted about the use of K-Pop idols in post-pandemic
diplomacy. While face to face interactions between diplomats ceased during the pandemic, the
global popularity of K-Pop did not. For example, immediately upon assuming office on Jan. 21,
2021, the official Twitter account for the U.S.Vice President Kamala Harris followed BTS. This
led to theories that Harris might be a BTS or K-Pop fan.82 Therefore, it will be interesting to see
the context of events if and when Harris meets BTS in the future.

Conclusion
This exploratory paper underscores the need for increased analysis on the use of pop
cultural figures in public diplomacy. By looking specifically at state-sponsored events, idol-state
interactions appear to make up only one tactic within the Moon administration’s public
diplomacy strategy. As illustrated in the different treatment of Ivanka Trump and the daughter of
the Indonesian President, idol-state interactions are only utilized in certain circumstances. This is
because while both individuals were reported to be fans of K-Pop, only Ivanka Trump was able
to meet an idol group in-person with the help of the South Korean government.
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The two case studies presented in this paper also allude to the use of idol-state
interactions during politically tense situations. While this could be a tactic to soften media
coverage or increase the audience for diplomatic affairs, future research should be conducted
using media monitoring to understand the target audience for idol-state interactions.
As the global popularity and economic power of K-Pop continues to grow, future
research should also examine how the increased popularity of K-Pop translates into foreign
policy decisions. Within South Korea, the international success of K-Pop is transforming South
Korean institutions and norms. One group at the forefront of this is BTS, whose international
success sparked domestic debate about if K-Pop idols should be exempted from South Korea’s
mandatory military service. As a result of this debate, a law was passed by the South Korean
National Assembly allowing those who excel in popular culture to delay their military service
requirement by two years. The caveat to this law being that qualified individuals must be
recommended by the Minister of Culture. However, this also indicates the South Korean
government’s commitment to the promotion of popular culture. Therefore, it will be interesting
to see how idol-state interactions occur in the future. Additionally, a comparison of
Korean-language media coverage and English-language media coverage on idol-state
interactions could prove interesting. While this paper was limited to English-language news
outlets, it would be interesting to compare how idol-state interactions are reported domestically
versus internationally.
Beyond South Korea, scholars could examine how other pop cultural figures are being
used in state public diplomacy strategies. While this study was limited to K-Pop idols and the
South Korean government, it would be interesting to see if idol-state interactions occur between
Bollywood actors and the Indian government, or reggaeton artists and Latin American
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governments. While both Bollywood films and reggaeton have witnessed extreme success in the
global market, the relationship between these cultural products and state government is unclear.
If possible, future research should seek to identify if these phenomena are being harnessed by
states or not, and if not, why not.
Idol-state interactions make up one aspect of pop cultural diplomacy. As state-sponsored
activities, analyzing these interactions can provide the opportunity for scholars to examine
interactions that occur beyond the scope of the state, or idol-driven interactions. The idol-state
framework could also be applied to the study of multinational corporations and how they
influence cultural policies across the world. A future case study within this field could be S.M.
Entertainment’s commitment to expand the global audience of K-Pop through the use of K-Pop
groups that communicate in languages other than Korean. In addition, examining the adoption of
HYBE Entertainment’s BTS-themed Korean language textbook series could prove an interesting
study about how the goals of pop culture organizations and states align. Looking beyond South
Korea, it would be interesting to examine how Bollywood production houses expand their
products’ reach beyond India. In addition, like BTS, Bollywood actors have previously worked
on various UNICEF campaigns. By examining the process of how celebrities partner with
international organizations, scholars could better understand the implications of idol-driven
interactions.
While on the surface, the use of K-Pop idols during diplomatic meetings might seem
strange, this paper has shown that idol-state interactions can be used as a relationship and
audience building tool, as well as a method of cultural exchange. In order for research in this
field to continue to develop, scholars must acknowledge their own biases and perceptions
towards certain pop cultural products. Only by looking at pop culture through an objective lens,
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will we be able to understand the mechanisms states use to harness soft power resources. Finally,
by creating a framework to analyze how these products are currently used, scholars will be able
to utilize new technologies and research methodologies to gauge the long-term effectiveness of
pop cultural diplomacy.
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Appendix A: Photo Gallery
United States First Lady Melania Trump
and K-Pop idol Choi Min-ho from SHINee
pose with one another during the launch of
“Girls Play 2” initiative at the U.S.
Embassy in South Korea on Nov. 7, 2017.
The purpose of the event was to create
awareness about a campaign to promote
girls’ participation in sports ahead of the
2018 Winter Olympic Games in South
Korea. However, media coverage of the
event mostly discussed a viral video of a
teenage girl screaming after meeting Choi.
This event signals the ability for pop
cultural figures to increase the audience for
diplomatic events that would otherwise
garner less media coverage. However,
future research that utilizes media
monitoring methodologies must be
conducted. Photos from Yonhap News
Agency.
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(From left to right) The constitutional North Korean head of state Kim Yong-nam and the sister
of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Kim Yo-jong sit beside South Korean President Moon
Jae-in and his wife during a performance by the Samjiyon Orchestra on Feb. 11, 2018. The event
marked the first time such high-level North Korean officials have visited South Korea. Photo
from Cheong Wa Dae.

North Korean Hyon Song-wol [right] and South Korean Lee Yoon-sang [left] meet to discuss the
logistics of the South Korean art troupe’s Pyongyang performance on March 20, 2018. Lee, a
South Korean singer and composer, was appointed as the chief delegate for the South Korean art
troupe to North Korea. His appointment marked the first time an entertainer has represented
South Korea during Inter-Korean talks. Similarly, Hyon is the leader of the North Korean
Moranbong Band. The appointment of the two artists potentially helped the ‘Spring is Coming’
concert to be perceived as an artist-to-artist exchange versus a political strategy. Photo from the
South Korean Ministry of Unification.
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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un poses alongside members of the South Korean art troupe on
April 2, 2018. The art troupe included several famous Korean singers along with the K-Pop idol
group, Red Velvet. Photo from Yonhap News Agency.
North Korean
leader Kim
Jong-un speaks
to the members
of Red Velvet
and other South
Korean
performers
following their
performance in
Pyongyang on
April 2, 2018.
Photo from The
Associated
Press.
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White House advisor Ivanka Trump poses alongside South Korean President Moon Jae-in and
his wife, as well as the members of the K-Pop group EXO and CL, a former member of the
group 2NE1 on Feb. 25, 2018. The photo following EXO and CL’s performance at the closing
ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympic Games. Photo from Yonhap News Agency. Trump can also
be seen using the popular Korean heart hand gesture, a popular gesture for K-Pop idols to make
with their fans.

48

United States President Donald Trump meets with members of EXO on June 29, 2019, at
Cheong Wa Dae before a dinner with South Korean President Moon Jae-in. The K-Pop group
was invited to greet Trump in South Korea after they had met Ivanka Trump after the closing
ceremony at the 2018 Winter Olympics. Photo from Cheong Wa Dae.

President Trump, President Moon, First Lady Kim, Ivanka Trump, Jared Kushner, U.S. Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin, and additional members
of the Moon administration pose alongside five members from K-Pop group EXO. Photo from
Cheong Wa Dae.
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